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The relationship between unemployment and crime is the subject of research 
and debate. We present evidence that suggests that recidivism among ex-offenders 
can be reduced by providing unemployment compensation available immediately 
after their release from prison. A California program made such benefits-- 
transitional aid--available during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Using a 5-year 
follow-up and a failure-time model, we show how recidivism among an eligible 
group was consistently lower over those 5 years than for an ineligible group. 
KEY WORDS: recidivism; transitional aid; failure-time model; regression- 
discontinuity design. 
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N  
R e c i d i v i s m  is a p r o b l e m  as o l d  as i ts p r e c o n d i t i o n ,  i m p r i s o n m e n t .  
C o n s i d e r  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  b y  t h e  S t a t e  B o a r d  o f  D i r e c t o r s  o f  S a n  Q u e n t i n  
p r i s o n  in  1858,  w h i c h  s t a t e s  c l e a r l y  s o m e  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  i s sues :  
Besides, after they leave the Prison, such is the uncharitableness of the world, 
that, with the mark of the Prison upon them, they find it almost impossible to 
obtain employment. They rarely find friends to extend an encouraging hand to 
them, and, meeting with no sympathy except amongst their old associates in 
crime, they come to the conclusion that society is waging an unrelenting warfare 
against them, and every honest impulse of their souls is destroyed. (Board of 
Prison Directors, California State Prison, 1858) 
T h e s e  s e n t i m e n t s  a r e  e c h o e d  in  a l a t e r  s t a t e m e n t  b y  t h e  S t a t e  B o a r d  o f  
P r i s o n  D i r e c t o r s  f o r  C a l i f o r n i a  in  t h e i r  b i e n n i a l  r e p o r t  f o r  1 9 0 2 - 1 9 0 4 :  
Another serious question is, what shah become of the convicts after they are 
discharged? Under the present law they are given a small sum of money and a 
suit of clothes and transportation to the place from which they came; but unless 
they know a trade or had some means of earning a livelihood before they entered 
prison their sojourn within does not fit them for earning a livelihood after they 
leave its walls. (Board of Prison Directors, California State Prison, 1905) 
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Prison officials are not alone in their selection of employment as a 
critical feature of the postprison experience. Over and over, parole agents, 
other criminal justice officials, and community leaders emphasize the 
importance of employment after release for the inmate's successful (i.e., 
noncriminal) readjustment to society. The exact link between employment 
and recidivism, and between employment and crime generally, is still the 
subject of research (Rossi et al., 1980; Freeman, 1983; Schmidt and Witte, 
1984; Thornberry and Christenson, 1984) and debate (Zeisel, 1982; Rossi 
et al., 1982). But one well-known and seldom-disputed fact is that imprison- 
ment does little to enhance the inmate's employment prospects after release. 
Research on employment and crime has generally identified a nonposi- 
tive relationship between the two (i.e., employment does not seem to increase 
participation in crime), but any number of issues remain. Since most of the 
studies dealing with recidivism have concentrated on the first few months 
or the first year after release (e.g., Rossi et al., 1980; Maltz, 1984), the 
long-term relationship between crime and employment is uncertain. For 
example, it could be argued that, because of the employment patterns among 
ex-offenders, short-term studies miss the point. Many ex-offenders go from 
menial job to menial job, with sometimes substantial periods of unemploy- 
ment in between (Glaser, 1964; Pownall, 1969; Witte, 1975, 1976). Therefore, 
short-term studies may capture only the effect of the first job after release 
and  the pressures of parole agents and family to be employed. Once those 
pressures lessen, and/or the ex-offender experiences unemployment, there 
could be a return to criminality. In fact, Thornberry and Christenson (1984) 
found such a reciprocal relationship between crime and unemployment in 
a subsample of the Philadelphia birth cohort originally studied by Wolfgang 
et al. (1972). 
We examine the issue of long-term effects for a group of ex-offenders 
released from California prisons during the later 1970s who, during their 
imprisonment, could have become eligible for unemployment compensation 
benefits after release. Based on information about eligibility for unemploy- 
ment compensation and FBI "rap sheet" information, our finding is that, 
over the 5 years after release from prison, ex-offenders eligible for the 
benefits had a lower recidivism rate than the ineligible group. Our argument 
is that this finding is best understood in light of the intent of the program--to 
provide ex-offenders with monetary aid in their search for jobs--and in 
light of a theoretical link between crime and employment. 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. The LIFE and TARP Studies 
Two of the most prominent studies of employment and crime were 
done in the early and mid-1970s and funded by the United States Department 
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of Labor. The first of these, the LIFE (Living Insurance for Ex-Offenders) 
project, was conducted in Baltimore during the period 1971 to 1974. Its 
purpose was to test and compare the effects of weekly payments and job 
counseling on postprison adjustment. A total of 432 released offenders was 
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups: the treatment groups 
received some combination of job placement counseling and /or  weekly 
payments of $60 for 13 weeks; the control groups were "treated" as ordinary 
releasees from prison. [For a complete description of the program, see 
Lenihan (1978).] 
The program was based on the seemingly simple notion that some 
crime is based on economic need. If certain crimes are financially motivated, 
some ex-offenders without a job and sufficient resources to support job 
search efforts might resort to illegal activities as a source of income. Lenihan 
(1978, p. 5) states that "implicit in such a perspective is the view that for 
some people, certain crimes of theft (robbery, burglary, and larceny) are 
economically rational acts--that  is, for the person committing a property 
crime, the act is purposeful and, considering the alternative ways of getting 
money available to the offender, also efficient." Therefore, economic aid 
may provide enough income to prevent certain types of  income-generating 
crimes. Alternatively, the aid may increase the costs to the perpetrator of 
all crimes: ex-offenders would have more to lose by committing crimes and 
perhaps being caught and might refrain from criminal activities entirely. 
The results of the LIFE experiment were mixed but encouraging. There 
were no overall differences in recidivism rates between treatment and control 
groups (Lenihan, 1978, p. 3). However, the treatment group did experience 
a reduction in the number of arrests for property offenses relative to the 
control group. The payments appeared to work as intended, at least to the 
extent that further involvement in income-generating crimes was reduced. 
The TARP (Transitional Aid Research Project) experiment came next, 
beginning where the LIFE experiment ended. A major goal of TARP was 
to replicate the LIFE results, while testing a wider array of treatments. One 
group of randomly assigned ex-offenders in the two states of Texas and 
Georgia received weekly payments of financial aid, for periods of 13 or 26 
weeks, with tax rates on earnings of either 25 or 100% (earnings were taxed 
by reducing weekly payments accordingly). Ex-offenders in Georgia 
received $70 per week, while those in Texas received $63 per week. Another 
treatment group received job placement services and control-group members 
were again treated as ordinary releasees. 
The monetary treatment in TARP was not a success overall. An 
analysis of variance showed no differences between the treatment and the 
control groups in either state for the number of arrests in a 1-year follow-up 
period (Rossi et aL, 1980, pp. 91-95). But it had already been posited 
that a treatment effect might be masked by work disincentives due to the 
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experimental payments. Released offenders receiving the payments could 
wait before finding work, or work less, and therefore have more time in 
which to commit crimes. Any reduction in criminality brought about by the 
payments might be canceled out by any increase in leisure time also brought 
about by the payments. Once these insights were incorporated within a 
"counterbalancing" theoretical model, and an analysis was conducted based 
on that model, the weekly payments were shown to have these effects: a 
reduction in work effort that led to an increase in arrests during the follow-up 
period, but also a reduction in the number of arrests for property and  
nonproperty offenses during that period once work effort was held constant. 
The TARP analysis is not without its critics [see Zeisel (1982) for a comment 
and Rossi et al. (1982) for a reply], and perhaps the most prudent comment 
on TARP is that, at worst, there were no treatment effects. At the same 
time, neither the experimental results nor the counterbalancing model 
showed the payments leading to an overall increase in criminal activity. 
2.2. California Senate Bil l  224 
In response to the problems of recidivism and inspired by the LIFE 
findings, the California state legislature in 1977 passed Senate Bill 224 
(SB224). The bill mandated that, beginning in July of 1978, adults released 
from prison could apply for unemployment insurance. Eligibility was to be 
obtained by working at prison jobs or by participating in prison vocational 
programs after January 1, 1977. For both kinds of activities, nominal 
earnings were accumulated at the then minimum wage of $2.50 an hour 
(the real wage rate was closer to 20r Prisoners who worked a minimum 
of 653 hr over a 12-month base period were eligible for unemployment 
compensation benefits after release. The amount of benefits received depen- 
ded upon the total number of hours worked in prison, with the effective 
range of  support between $30 and $70 a week for up to 26 weeks. 
The usual California state regulations applied to program recipients. 
These ex-offenders had to be looking seriously for work and were subject 
to the standard agency forgiveness provisions. An upper limit of $25 a week 
could be earned with no reductions in payments, but for earnings in excess 
of $25 a week, weekly payments were reduced dollar for dollar. 
2.3. An Economic Model  
As suggested by Lenihan's above-cited comment, an explicitly 
economic model was the foundation for the LIFE study; this was equally 
true for TARP and was incorporated in the design of SB224. The importance 
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of an economic model for understanding the relationship between unem- 
ployment and recidivism specifically, and crime more generally, cannot be 
underestimated. As Thornberry and Christenson (1984, p. 398) note, the 
four major criminological perspectives--social control theory, strain theory, 
social learning theory, and integrated models--"al l  adopt a unidirectional 
or asymmetrical causal structure . . . .  they ignore the possibility that crime 
and its presumed causes are embedded in a reciprocal causal structure, 
mutually influencing one another over the person's life span." Thornberry 
and Christenson (1984, p. 400) go on to state that "the hypothesis that 
unemployment influences crime is explicitly developed in most etiological 
theories of  crime, while the reciprocal hypothesis, that crime also influences 
unemployment,  is implicit in and can be derived from these same theories." 
While these authors do develop an empirical model specification based on 
these traditional criminological perspectives, we argue that, for an essentially 
economic problem, an economic model should also be consulted. 
Since Becker's pioneering work in the 1960s (Becker, 1968), economists 
have formulated several different models of criminal choice. Although the 
various economic models are dependent on individual authors for their 
particular formulations, they do share a common orientation and, within 
categories of models, a common specification of the relevant variables. First, 
economic models are based on the notion that individuals make decisions 
partly on the basis of expected costs and benefits. Of particular importance 
is the concept of expected opportunity costs: the value of the next-best 
option given up when making one choice from among several options. For 
example, the decision to participate in crime, and therefore allocate a certain 
number of hours to illegal activities, means that less time would be available 
for legal activities. Legally obtained income would be reduced, or eliminated 
entirely if criminal activity resulted in time in jail or prison. 
Second, there is the premise that individuals may allocate time (or in 
some models, income) to both legal and illegal income-generating activities 
and that their time allocation decisions will depend on the relative payoffs 
from each. Individuals may specialize in one activity or the other (e.g., 
honest citizens as opposed to career criminals), but splitting time between 
legal and illegal activities implies that the decision to commit a crime is 
not a simple either/or decision. It also implies that merely increasing an 
individual's legitimate income, perhaps through transfer payments, may not 
decrease his/her participation in illegitimate activities. Rather, the 
individual has the choice to decrease legal activities (i.e., substitute the 
transfer payments for legitimate work) or decrease participation in illegal 
activities (i.e., substitute for the illegitimate "work" instead). 
Recently, Schmidt and Witte (1984) have formally presented several 
alternative models based on these economic assumptions. The most complex 
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of these models (Schmidt and Witte, 1984, pp. 163-165) is consistent with 
the TARP counterbalancing model and with Thornberry and Christenson's 
reciprocal model of  crime and unemployment.  The Schmidt and Witte 
model postulates that time allocations to legal and illegal activities can 
occur in any order over time. This is in marked contrast to earlier economic 
models, where allocations to legal activities were assumed to take logical 
precedence. Rather, the time allocations can occur in either order and it is 
possible for allocations to change over time. Two important implications 
are that longitudinal studies are necessary for understanding the long-term 
relationship between crime and unemployment  and that feedback between 
economic factors and criminal behavior must be taken into account. 
As we detail in the next section, our data are limited to a longitudinal 
study of a particular type. We have data only on officially detected criminal 
activity during the 5 years after individual ex-offenders were released from 
California prisons. We have no unemployment  information, and con- 
sequently we can estimate a model for criminal activity whose only economic 
factor is the initial exposure to the California program. In terms of the 
TARP counterbalancing model, we estimate a reduced-form equation for 
criminal activity. Nevertheless, we hypothesize that, based on an economic 
model and previous research (e.g., Lenihan, 1978; Rossi et  al., 1980; Free- 
man, 1983), there will be reduction in recidivism as a result of SB224. For 
several reasons, we expect that the beneficial aspects of  the treatment will 
not be cancelled by the work disincentives the payments create. 
First, the relevant economic theory states that, in terms of opportunity 
costs, payments  can have two effects. The payments themselves create 
opportunity costs-- the money cannot be collected if the ex-offender is in 
jail or prison. And if the ex-offender finds a better job while collecting 
unemployment  compensation,  that job has opportunity costs-- i t  is very 
likely lost if the ex-offender is reincarcerated. Second, law-abiding behavior 
such as employment  may have its own utility. Put differently, there is a 
variety of  social benefits accrued through law-abiding activity generally and 
employment  specifically. For example, one can gain a larger friendship 
network and an increased social status (see Liker, 1982; Nock and Rossi, 
1978). And of course there are the pressures that parole agents put on 
ex-offenders to become and remain employed. 3 Finally, the weekly payments 
that ex-offenders in our sample received were, on the average, only $45. 
This is in contrast to the $60 and $70 amounts that were part of  the TARP 
treatment several years before. It is difficult to argue that $45 is a strong 
3 Employed ex-offenders typically gain status with their parole agents. For example, drug 
addicts may be required to submit urine tests less frequently. But more generally, parole 
agents perceive a strong link between crime and unemployment and they treat employed 
ex-offenders as better risks than the unemployed. 
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work disincentive for very many people. However, the weekly payments 
may have provided enough of a cushion such that, as in TARP, ex-offenders 
were more selective about employment and tried to find better jobs than 
they otherwise might have taken. 
In summary, we expect to find that the unemployment compensation 
will lead to short-term decreases in criminality. Similarly, we expect such 
a finding to hold over time. 
3. DATA AND M E T H O D S  
SB224 also mandated that an outcome assessment be done, and data 
collection for this evaluation was undertaken in two phases. Data were first 
obtained during 1980 and 1981 and are discussed by Rauma and Berk 
(1982). After a brief presentation of these data, we discuss additional data 
on the program obtained during 1984 and 1985. 
The initial data set consisted of a sample of about 1100 releasees f'rom 
California prisons who applied for the unemployment benefits and were 
followed for 10 months after their application for benefits. The vast majority 
of ex-offenders applied in the first month after release from prison, and 
approximately 80% of the sample was determined to be eligible for unem- 
ployment compensation. These data reflect an historical period when vir- 
tually all prisoners were released on parole, and therefore, recidivism during 
a 10-month period after release would necessarily involve a parole violation. 
Thus, a "failure," according to parole follow-up data maintained by the 
California Department of Corrections (CDC), was defined conceptually as 
any of the following: 
(1) a felony offense resulting in parole revocation and /or  return to 
prison; 
(2) a parolee at large (PAL), resulting in parole revocation and /or  
return to prison; 
(3) technical violations resulting in parole revocation and /or  return 
to prison; and 
(4) misdemeanors resulting in parole revocation and /o r  return to 
prison. 
All other kinds of violations were not defined as failures because they 
were far less serious (e.g., vehicular offenses) or because their legal status 
was unclear (e.g., arrest and release). In brief, failure was defined in a 
manner that would reflect serious violations of parole and presumably a 
return to criminality. Thus, the outcome measure for the CDC data was 
10 Rauma and Berk 
basically a parole revocation that would, in principle, result in a return to 
prison. 4 
The CDC records used to define failure were limited in one important 
respect (beyond the usual kinds of problems one can expect to find in 
administrative files). Since parole periods did not last more than 2 years, 
the follow-up period was limited to at most 24 months. And due to the 
2.5-year window from which the sample was drawn, no more than 10 months 
of follow-up data was available on the full sample at the time of the 
evaluation. Of course, given that the benefits lasted no more than 6 months 
and most ex-offenders applied early after release, a 10-month follow-up 
period should be sufficient to detect short-term effects. Surely, the total 
impact of several months of payments would be felt within a year. However, 
if one were interested in long-term effects, such as whether crimes were 
being postponed by the payments rather than eliminated, even the maximum 
follow-up period of 24 months is a serious constraint. 
Additional data were collected on the original sample in order to 
address the question of long-term effect. FBI "rap sheets" were used as a 
source of information about criminal activity during the first 5 years after 
application for unemployment benefits. In contrast to the CDC data, the 
FBI data provided different types of information about criminal activities. 
Rap sheets seemingly give a wealth of information, but they lack explana- 
tions about such things as charge reductions from the time of arrest to 
adjudication and too often contain no information about the final disposition 
of arrests and court appearances. In order to use information consistently 
available, we coded events as failures when they met this criterion: arrests 
that resulted in a conviction for a nonvehicular offense and a minimum of 
3 months in jail or prison. Conviction and time spent in jail were a screen 
for apprently minor cases, using the simple rule that, all things being equal, 
time actually spent in jail (and prison of course) was an indicator of a more 
serious crime. 
If the FBI data had proved to be simply a complement to the CDC 
data, all would have been well. Unfortunately, efforts to compare FBI 
failures to CDC failures led to troubling anomalies. Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative number of failures during the follow-up period, in 6-month 
intervals, according to the source of the failure information. One readily 
apparent difference between the CDC and the FBI data is that, since the 
CDC data do not follow a parolee for more than 24 months, the CDC-only 
curve is flat after 24 months. More importantly, however, there are increas- 
ingly larger disparities between the CDC and the FBI data, even in the first 
4 Often, time spent in jail prior to a revocation is subtracted from one's sentence. Consequently, 
it was possible to have a parole revoked, have the original sentence reimposed, and still not 
serve time in a state prison. 
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24 months. For example,  during the first 6 months after release, there are 
128 failures in the FBI-only data and 247 failures in the CDC-only data 
but only 104 failures jointly defined by both sources. And the gap widens 
after that. We cannot account fully for such discrepancies, but we do have 
some plausible explanations. 
At least part of  the problem stems from the different paths that reports 
take to the two agencies. The CDC data come directly from parole officers, 
who are required to document  all officially designated parole violations. In 
contrast, the FBI data come from police departments and, typically, include 
only violations that led to an arrest or arrests, usually without mention of 
parole violations. 5 Moreover,  not all police departments send arrest reports 
to the FBI. Another complication is that CDC records do not explicitly 
distinguish parole violations that result in a return to prison from parole 
violations that do not result in a return to pr ison--violators  may be given 
credit for time served in jail awaiting the parole revocation hearing. The 
best we could do in the CDC data was infer when reincarceration occurred. 
In contrast, the FBI data were coded so that a failure required clear evidence 
of time served. That is, a failure was recorded when there was a conviction 
and evidence that at least 3 months were spent confined. 6 A similar determi- 
nation could not be made from the CDC data. 
5 The one exception occurs when, under California law, the parole agent arrests the parolee 
in order to take h im/her  into custody. 
6 In order to screen out apparently minor violations, we decided that some minimum threshold 
had to be exceeded before reincarceration was assumed. We felt that this was evidence, aside 
from the statutory charge, of a more serious infraction. 
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The disparities between the two data sources are troubling, and we 
know of no fully satisfactory way to construct a composite outcome measure. 
However, since it is only in the FBI data that long-term trends can be 
pursued, the FBI data, of necessity, serve as the source of information on 
failures. In other words, failures that are reported only in the CDC data 
are ignored. Our reliance solely on the FBI data no doubt means that some 
unknown number of failures is not counted. Yet, such underreporting should 
not matter unless the underreporting is associated with the treatment after 
proper statistical controls are introduced. We discuss in the next section the 
issue of what constitutes proper statistical controls. 
3.1.  The  R e g r e s s i o n - D i s c o n t i n u i t y  D e s i g n  
The strong legislative language requiring an impact assessment was not 
matched with a commitment to a randomized experiment. Yet since eligibil- 
ity was fully determined by a single threshold of prison earnings, the 
legislation generated de facto a regression-discontinuity design (Campbell 
and Stanley, 1963; Cook and Campbell, 1979). Such a design was not 
planned by the legislation's sponsors; it simply happened, but the resulting 
data can be analyzed as if a planned regression-discontinuity design had 
been carried out. The regression-discontinuity approach is perhaps the 
strongest quasi-experimental design known, and it is to the properties of 
the design that we now turn. 
Justification for the regression-discontinuity design can be found in 
Rubin's (1978) concept of "ignorability". Imagine, as in Fig. 2, that some 
response variable R (e.g., a felony arrest) is a function of the presence or 
absence of  some treatment T (e.g., eligibility for unemployment benefits), 
a set of X covariates (e.g., prior record, age, marital status, etc.), and a 
T = f ( X )  ~. e 1 
R R =  f ( X , T )  + e 2 
e 2 
T 
l C o v ( e l e  2) = 0 
e l  
Fig. 2. Path diagram illustrating ignorability. 
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disturbance process e2 that meets the usual OLS assumptions. Also imagine 
that assignment to the treatment and control conditions depends on X and 
some disturbance process e~ meeting the usual OLS assumptions. Finally, 
assume that the two disturbance processes are unrelated and that f (X ,  T) 
is a linear funct ionf  
For the assignment process to be ignorable, all of the covariates 
included in X must be known, measured, and used in any analysis of  the 
treatment 's  impact on R. Thus, if the analysis is undertaken with multiple 
regression, the set of  variables in X would define the full set of required 
regressors. 
Note that in Fig. 3, variables represented by Z, which affect the response 
but not the assignment of  T, can be safely ignored. Since the Z's do not 
affect both T and R, unbiased estimates of  the impact of  T on R can be 
obtained even if the Z ' s  are not taken into account. (However,  including 
the Z variables in an analysis of  any treatment effects will improve one's 
statistical power.) 
For ex post facto designs, it is very difficult to demonstrate that all of  
the covariates in X have been included. That is, when the researcher is 
simply presented with a set of  observational data, the possibility of  
specification error clouds all substantive interpretations. And unfortunately, 
with the exception of the LIFE and TARP experiments, ex post facto designs 
dominate the literature on recidivism. 
The best method to minimize the possibility of  specification error is to 
employ random assignment to treatment and control conditions. Looking 
T : f ( X )  + e 1 
X R R =  f ( X , Z , T )  * e 2 
e2  
T" l C o V ( e l e 2 )  = 0 
gl 
Fig. 3. Path diagram illustrating ignorability. 
7 The assumption of linearity is crucial. We discuss this assumption later. 
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back at Fig. 2, the link between X and T is cut; the assignment mechanism 
is solely a function of some chance process represented by e~. Consequently, 
the X variables are effectively transformed into the Z variables shown in 
Fig. 3. In this situation, omitting the X's  can only reduce one's statistical 
power. 
A weaker but still potent alternative is to use a deterministic assignment 
process. Looking at Fig. 4, A represents some assignment variable (or 
variables) interposed between X and T. Under the provisions of SB224, 
prison earnings were such a variable. If a subject's value on A, or a scaled 
combination of A's, falls below (above) some threshold, the subject is given 
the control condition. If the subject's value falls on or above (below) the 
threshold, the subject is given the experimental condition. The impact of 
X on T is now funneled completely through A. Holding A constant in an 
analysis of the impact of T on R will, in principle, yield unbiased estimates 
regardless of  the presence or absence of X (Rubin, 1977). 
One drawback to this alternative is that the functional form of the 
relationship between A and R must be closely approximated. Cook and 
Campbell (1979, pp. 137-142) stress that failure to specify properly the 
functional form between A and R may well produce "pseudo-effects." As 
Rubin (1977) explains, the generic problem is that the regression of R on 
A must, for the experimentals, be extrapolated into the region of the controls, 
while for the controls, the regression of R on A must be extrapolated into 
the region of  the experimentals. This is because there are no experimentals 
below (above) the threshold on A and no controls above (below) the 
threshold on A. Thus, there are no data to test directly the appropriateness 
of the extrapolations. A second drawback is that the regression-discontuinity 
approach results in less statistical power than random assignment. The 
e 1 ' A  R T = f ( A )  
e 2  
T 
A =  f ( X )  § 9 1 
R = f ( X , A , T )  + e 2 
Fig. 4. Path diagram illustrating ignorability. 
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inevitable correlation between the assignment variable and the treatment 
dummy variable will increase the variance of any estimates of the treatment 
effect. As a result, one typically needs larger samples and /or  larger treatment 
effects than under random assignment. 
To summarize (see also Berk and Rauma, 1983), the regression-discon- 
tinuity design, while weaker than a true experimental design, is far superior 
to an ex post facto design in which the assignment process is not well 
understood. For the analysis of unemployment compensation, our assign- 
ment variable (A) is prison earnings. The covariates include such variables 
as age, sex, race, prior record, and drug history. These are a standard array 
of background and parole-related variables chosen for their impact on 
postprison adjustment. The response variable is the elapsed time between 
release and a return to prison for a new offense. In other words, we analyze 
our regression-discontinuity design within a failure-time statistical 
framework. 
3.2. The Time-to-Failure Model 
In our earlier work, we relied primarily on a binary outcome (fail or 
not) and a logistic regression model for the analysis of the regression- 
discontinuity data (Berk and Rauma, 1983). However, one can improve on 
statistical efficiency by using techniques that take as the dependent variable 
the elapsed time between exposure to the experimental or control condition 
and either a failure or the end of the follow-up period. Failure-time models 
have a long history in biostatistics and have been used in criminal justice 
research since the late 1970s (e.g., Maltz and McCleary, 1977). 
We report failure-time results for the 5-year period after release from 
prison. For computational convenience, we employ follow-up data grouped 
into ten 6-month time intervals. This amounts to estimating a logistic 
regression (using a binary outcome) for each time period, with all coefficients 
except the intercepts constrained to be equal across time periods. Each 
logistic regression includes only those individuals still at risk (i.e., those 
who have not yet failed) during the time period in question. 
The analytic cost of grouping into discrete time intervals is small. As 
the number of the time periods increases and as the duration of each time 
period decreases, the discrete model approaches the Cox proportionai 
hazard regression formulation in continuous time (Lawless, t982, pp. 372- 
377). Our experience is that the approach occurs very quickly and that 
results in continuous time would not be substantively differentf 
Note that by using only those individuals still at risk, one is taking right-hand censoring 
formally into account in each of the logistic regressions. 
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4. F I N D I N G S  
T a b l e  I s h o w s  s o m e  s e l e c t e d  d e s c r i p t i v e  s ta t i s t i cs  fo r  o u r  f inal  s a m p l e .  9 
By a n d  la rge ,  t h e  s ta t i s t i cs  r evea l  j u s t  a b o u t  w h a t  o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  a n d  
w h a t  e a r l i e r  e x p e r i m e n t a l  s t u d i e s  h a v e  s h o w n .  A m a j o r i t y  o f  t he  s a m p l e  is 
m a l e  ( 9 7 % ) ,  a m i n o r i t y  is w h i t e  ( 4 5 % ) ,  t he  m e a n  IQ is well  w i t h i n  t he  
Table I. Selected Descriptive Statistics (N = 1072) 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Parole failure (dummy) 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Received benefits (dummy) 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Maximum weekly benefits ($)~ 44.80 10.53 30.0 100.0 
Time between release and 
application (weeks) 1.86 2.63 0 8.7 
Time between application and 
first benefits (weeks) ~ 5.08 2.04 4.3 21.7 
Age at release (years) 32.37 8.27 20 63 
Male (dummy) 0.97 0.16 0 1 
White (dummy) 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Opiate addict (dummy) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Has escape history (dummy) 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Has juvenile commitments (dummy) 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Number of prior prison terms (integers) 0.58 0.97 0 4 
Grade placement score (integers) 7.55 2.91 0 12 
IQ score (integers) 92.87 11.27 68 140 
Length of last prison term (months) 30.75 24.64 3 244 
Length of last camp term (months) b 1.66 3.95 0 27 
Was released on work furlough (dummy) 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Released to Los Angeles county (dummy) 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Released to San Diego County (dummy) 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Released to San Francisco County (dummy) 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Released to Alemeda County (dummy) 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Parole Region 1 (dummy) 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Parole Region 2 (dummy) 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Parole Region 3 (dummy) 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Parole Region 4 (dummy) 0.26 0.44 0 1 
For ex-offenders who received benefits (N = 842). 
b Most people had no camp time. 
9 The sample size differs from the earlier study, for several reasons. First, a number of individuals 
have died since their release from prison in the late 1970s. Their FBI files have been closed 
and the information is not readily accessible. Second, some individuals who were previously 
eliminated from consideration because their follow-up was less than 10 months have now 
been added. In each instance, the number of cases was small and not likely to affect the 
substantive outcome. 
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average range  (93), the mean  educa t iona l  grade  p l acemen t  score is well  
unde r  12 years  of  age (7.6), a subs tan t ia l  minor i ty  had  expe r i enced  commi t -  
ments  as juven i les  (34%) ,  and  most  were re leased  f rom m o d e r a t e l y  long 
sentences  (31 months) .  A n d  these d i s t r ibu t ions  o f  d e m o g r a p h i c  charac ter i s -  
tics in the  s amp le  are not  very different  f rom the d i s t r ibu t ions  o f  the same 
charac ter i s t ics  in the p o p u l a t i o n  o f  all inmates  re leased  dur ing  the same 
per iod ,  1977-1979 (see Berk and  Rauma ,  1983). It is also poss ib le  to learn  
a bi t  a b o u t  the  t r ea tment  f rom Table  I. On the average,  app l i can t s  filed for  
benefi ts  abou t  2 weeks  af ter  re lease,  and  benefi ts  a r r ived  on the average  
abou t  5 weeks  later.  In  the  exper imen ta l  g roup ,  the mean  m a x i m u m  pay-  
ments  for  which  ind iv idua l s  were el igible  was $45.00. t~ 
F igure  5 shows a g raph  o f  the cumula t ive  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  ex-pr i soners  
re incarce ra ted ,  b roken  down  by months  af ter  app l i ca t i on  and by  me mbe r -  
ship  in the  expe r imen ta l  or  control  g roup ,  for  bo th  C D C  and FBI  sources  
of  data .  Three  conc lus ions  are  easi ly drawn.  First ,  when one compares  
s imply  the fa i lure  p r o p o r t i o n s  for the  expe r imen ta l s  and  controls ,  without 
any partialing, it i s  c lear  that  member s  o f  the  cont ro l  g roup  are subs tan t ia l ly  
more  l ikely to fail, regard less  o f  the da ta  source.  In  the FBI  da ta ,  the gap  
be tween  the expe r imen ta l s  and  the cont ro ls  ranges  f rom abou t  5 to abou t  
12% and  even the smal les t  d i spar i t i es  are s ta t i s t ica l ly  s ignif icant  at the 0.05 
level. 
Propor t [en  of 
F a f l u r ~  
I Experimental 
Group  ( N = 8 4 2 )  
[ ]  Cor l t r~ l  G r o u p  
( N = 2 3 0 }  
- -  CDC Fa i lu res - -  
- -Exper~m ent~ ls  
COC Failures-- 
- -Con t ro l s  
1 2 3 r 5 6 7 8 8 10 
S i x - M o n t  h Per~eds 
Fig. 5. Gross treatment effects by length of follow-up period. 
~o Our experimental and control groups were carefully screened so that individuals who had 
other sources of unemployment eligibility were excluded. Individuals who did not accumulate 
sufficient hours in prison to qualify for the benefits could combine these hours with employ- 
ment after release in order to receive benefits. These "combined" compensation claims were 
excluded from the analysis, as were disability insurance claims. Together, these other types 
of claims accounted for only about 6% of all claims from the beginning of the program 
through January 1, 1981. For all practical purposes, therefore, benefits were delivered solely 
on the basis of prison earnings. 
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Second, the CDC and FBI data, despite the anomalies described earlier, 
agree that there is a difference between experimental and control groups. 
One possible and important  explanation is that the data source may be 
largely independent of  the treatment assignment process and of individual 
failures. In other words, we are no more likely to find experimentals or 
controls failing in one data source or the other. This graphical evidence is 
not conclusive, but it is certainly more comforting than a result showing 
the predicted treatment effect in one data source and the opposite effect in 
the other. 
Third, focusing exclusively on the FBI data, the arithmetic difference 
between the experimentals and the controls increases month by month up 
to about 24 months at risk. After 2 years, there is a roughly constant difference 
of about 0.10 between the two groups. In other words, differences in rates 
of recidivism occur within the first 2 years; afterward, the rates are fairly 
constant. Perhaps most importantly, the experimental and control groups 
do not converge. Thus, these gross treatment results appear  to show that 
the unemployment  compensat ion does not postpone criminality; rather, a 
difference is made early in the postprison experience that remains for at 
least the next few years. 
As an introduction to the failure-time results, consider Table II. The 
cross-tabulation at the top of the table builds directly on Fig. 5; it shows 
the treatment effect at 6 months. The statistics to the right of  the cross- 
tabulation, particularly the odds ratio and the logarithm of the odds ratio, 
have direct analogues in the multivariate tables. The odds ratio is 0.65, 
while the log of the odds ratio is -0.43. Both imply that the odds of failure 
for the experimentals is about two-thirds the odds of failure for the controls. 
The cross-tabulation at the bot tom of Table II  shows the treatment 
effect at 60 months. And to the right is a set of  statistics parallel to those 
provided for the first cross-tabulation. One important result is that, while 
the treatment effect looks bigger at 60 months than at 6 months in simple 
difference terms, the odds ratios for the two time points are very similar. 
That is, once one takes the base failure rate into account in each period, 
the gross treatment effects are comparable;  the odds of failure for the 
experimentals are about two-thirds the odds of failure for the controls. 
Table I I I  contains the maximum-likel ihood estimates and significance 
tests for the logistic time-to-failure model. The 10 period constants allow 
for different intercepts for each logistic regression estimated. The initial 
conclusion to be drawn from this table is that, for people still at risk to fail 
(i.e., those who have not yet failed), the probabili ty of  failure by and large 
declines as the follow-up period increases. Perhaps the poor  parole risks 
simply fail early, leaving behind a poor  of  better parole risks. Alternatively, 
the process of  staying out of  trouble itself produces benefits that, over time, 
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Table II. A Tabular Representation of the Gross Treatment Effects 
t9 
6 months at risk 
Failed Not failed 
Experimentals 0.11 0.89 
(91) (751) 




0.79 Failure odds (experimentals)=0.12 
(842) Failure odds (controls)= 0.19 
Odds ratio 
0 .21  (experimentals/controls) = 0.65 
(230) Natural log of odds ratio = -0.43 
1072 
60 months at risk 
Failed Not failed 
Experimentals 
Controls 
0.49 0.51 0.79 
(410) (432) (842) 
0.60 0.40 0.2I 
(138) (92) (230) 
0.51 0.49 1072 
(548) (524) 
Failure odds (experimentals)= 0.96 
Failure odds (controls) = 1.50 
Odds ratio 
(experimentals/controls) = 0.64 
Natural log of odds ratio = -0.45 
improve an ex-prisoner 's  chances.  The former  can be conceptual ized as a 
type o f  individual heterogeneity,  while the latter can be conceptual ized as 
a type o f  state dependence  (Hsiao,  1985, pp. 124-126). 
Recall that  the key to a credible analysis o f  regression-discontinuity 
data lies in properly model ing the relationship between the assignment 
variable (hours worked in prison) and the ou tcome variable (time to failure). 
We began with a single, l inear variable o f  hours worked in prison. Then, 
as the literature suggests (e.g., Trochim,  1984), we experimented with 
polynomial  functions o f  hours worked in prison, hoping  to catch impor tant  
nonlinearities. We also estimated separate logistic regressions for each of  
the 10 points in time (i.e., constraining none of  the estimates across 
equations) ,  trying polynomia l  functions o f  hours. Applying significance 
~ests to these efforts, we arrived at the three variables for hours worked in 
prison shown in Table I I I :  a linear funct ion o f  hours worked for time 
periods 1 through 6, another  linear funct ion o f  hours worked for periods 
7 through 10, and a quadrat ic  funct ion o f  hours worked for periods 1 
through 6. Nevertheless, it is apparent  f rom their coefficients and t values 
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Table III. Maximum-Likelihood Estimates for the Time-to-Failure Model 
Variable Coefficient t value P value 
Period 1 constant -1.09 -1.85 0.063 
Period 2 constant - 1.06 - 1.78 0,074 
Period 3 constant -1.26 -2.10 0.035 
Period 4 constant -1.65 -2.81 0.005 
Period 5 constant -1.67 -2.76 0,006 
Period 6 constant -1.89 -3.09 0.002 
Period 7 constant -2.05 -3.29 0.001 
Period 8 constant -2.49 -3.88 0.000 a 
Period 9 constant -2.07 -3.33 0,000 ~ 
Period 10 constant -2.51 -3.33 0.000 a 
Hours worked in prison, periods 1-6 0.17 0.47 0.565 
Hours worked in prison, periods 7-10 -0.01 -0.30 0.976 
Hours worked in prison squared, periods 1-6 -0.12 -1.02 0.309 
Eligible for treatment (dummy) -0.25 -1.32 0.095 b 
Addict (dummy) 0.50 5.40 0.000 ~ 
Age (years) -0.04 -4.72 0.000 ~ 
Months served in CDC camp during 
prior commitment -0.02 -1.20 0.228 
History of escapes (dummy) 0.49 4.28 0.000 a 
Achievement test score (grade equivalent) 0.01 0.52 0.599 
IQ score -0.00" -0.57 0.564 
History of juvenile offenses (dummy) 0.27 2.71 0.007 
Male (dummy) 0.46 1.42 0.153 
White (dummy) -0.20 -1.93 0.054 
Number of prior prison terms 0.09 1.44 0.150 
Released on work furlough (dummy) -0.18 -0.75 0.452 
Paroled to Oakland (dummy) 0.32 1.63 0.102 
Paroled to Los Angeles (dummy) -0.09 -0.58 0.558 
Paroled to San Diego (dummy) -0.08 -0.35 0.714 
Paroled to San Francisco (dummy) 0.03 0.17 0.868 
Paroled to Region 2 (dummy) 0.13 0.92 0.359 
Paroled to Region 3 (dummy) -0.08 -0.39 0.694 
Paroled to Region 4 (dummy) 0.20 1.26 0.207 
a Decimal value is smaller than the number of decimal digits displayed. 
h One-tailed test. 
t h a t  t he  a s s i g n m e n t  v a r i a b l e  is n o t  s t r o n g l y  r e l a t e d  to  t he  o u t c o m e .  Th i s  
has  i m p l i c a t i o n s  t h a t  we  d i s c u s s  la ter .  
We  h a v e  i n c l u d e d  in t h e  m o d e l  a n u m b e r  o f  c o v a r i a t e s  b e y o n d  f u n c t i o n s  
o f  h o u r s  w o r k e d  in p r i s o n .  I f  we  w e r e  e s t i m a t i n g  a l i n ea r  m o d e l ,  t he  so le  
p u r p o s e  o f  t h e s e  c o v a r i a t e s  w o u l d  be  to  i m p r o v e  s ta t i s t i ca l  p o w e r .  I n s o f a r  
as t he  e r r o r  s u m  o f  s q u a r e s  is r e d u c e d ,  s m a l l e r  s t a n d a r d  e r ro r s  resul t .  
H o w e v e r ,  fo r  n o n l i n e a r  m o d e l s ,  the  c o v a r i a t e s  p l ay  an  a d d i t i o n a l  a n d  
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important role. In brief, even with a randomized experiment, heterogeneity 
among the assigned units in the outcome will, for a wide variety of nonlinear 
models, lead to a particular type of biased treatment effect estimate (Gail 
et al., 1984). For linear models, such as linear regression or analysis of 
variance (properly implemented), randomization will suffice to produce 
unbiased estimates of treatment effects, which as a consequence of random 
assignment and a linear functional form, are not dependent on the distribu- 
tion of covariates in the population (from which the sample data are, in 
principle, drawn). However, for many nonlinear functional forms, such as 
the logistic, randomization wilt not yield the same result. The treatment 
estimate, for both linear and nonlinear models, compares the response 
within some population of a randomly selected unit exposed to the treatment 
with that of another randomly selected unit that is not exposed to the 
treatment. In contrast, the desired estimate of  the treatment effect, for each 
given unit, is a comparison of that unit's response to the control condition 
to that same unit's response to the experimental condition. The problem 
with nonlinear models is analogous to the functional form problem of the 
regression-discontinuity analysis. In the case of the linear model, the treat- 
ment effect can be readily extrapolated to the unobserved responses of each 
sampled uni t - - the  unobserved response of the treatment group to the control 
condition can be estimated by the observed response of the control group, 
and similarly, the unobserved response of the control group to the treatment 
condition can be estimated by the observed response of  the treatment group. 
Nonlinear models are generally problematic on this issue. Whereas non- 
linear models are necessarily population specific, linear models are not 
(Gail et al., 1984, p. 432). Consequently, in nonlinear models (with the 
exception of  certain exponential functional forms), one obtains treatment 
estimates that are independent of the particular distribution of the covariates 
in the population only if all sources of heterogeneity are partialed out via 
covariates. Put differently, nonlinear models require proper model 
specification even when treatment assignment has been random. 
Our regression-discontinuity design is meant to approximate closely 
the level of internal validity one may obtain with random assignment. 
However, even if we have managed to produce that close approximation, 
we remain vulnerable to the biasing effects of  individual heterogeneity. 
Hence, the covariates in Table III are intended to account for important 
sources of individual heterogeneity. Note that a number of large and 
statistically significant coefficients are reported, all of  which have sensible 
signs. For example, ex-prisoners who have been addicts, who are younger, 
who have a history of escape attempts, and who have a history of juvenile 
offenses are at much greater risk for reincarceration. Nevertheless, important 
heterogeneity may well remain, a point to which we return. 
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In  Table  III ,  the point  estimate for the impact  of u n e m p l o y m e n t  
compensa t ion  eligibility is -0 .25.  This translates into an odds ratio of 0.78; 
the odds of fail ing for the exper imentals  is 0.78 the odds of fail ing for the 
controls.  In  other words,  the estimated t rea tment  effect, par t ia l ing out 
funct ions  of  hours  worked in pr ison and  a n u m b e r  of other covariates, is 
a bit smaller  than  the gross t rea tment  effects reported in Table  II and  Fig. 
5. Using a nul l  hypothesis  of no effect and  a one- ta i led test, the t rea tment  
effect is statistically significant at the 0.10 level but  not  the 0.05 level. That  
is, if the t rea tment  effect were really zero, a negative coefficient as large as 
the one ob ta ined  could have occurred abou t  1 t ime in 10 by chance alone. 
There are a n u m b e r  of possible analyt ical  responses to the est imated 
t rea tment  effect. One opt ion  is to adopt  (in advance)  the 0.10 level of 
statistical significance and  then  reject the nul l  hypothesis  that the program 
did not  work. If  one has strong prior beliefs that  the program reduced 
re incarcera t ion  rates a n d / o r  has a loss func t ion  in which false negatives 
are especially t roubl ing,  this is a reasonable  response.  
A second opt ion  is to adopt  (again in advance)  the more convent iona l  
0.05 level of statistical significance and  then  fail to reject the nul l  hypothesis  
of no effect. If  one has few a priori  p reconcept ions  about  the program's  
effects, or s trong prior  beliefs that the program is ineffective (or harmful) ,  
a n d / o r  a loss func t ion  in which false positives are especially t roubl ing,  this 
is a reasonable  response.  
Yet a third op t ion  is to adopt  the 0.05 level of statistical significance 
bu t  use a t rea tment  effect as the nul l  hypothesis  that would  allow the 
program f inancial ly  to break even (rather than  a nul l  hypothesis  of zero). 
We have est imated that  a reduc t ion  in re incarcera t ion  rates of 5% overall 
would  make the program cost effective. ~1 At the mean  failure rate for both 
~ The total bill for SB224 cost California taxpayers about $15 million. While this is hardly 
cheap, even small reductions in reincarceration attributable to the program would make the 
program cost effective. At the time the legislation was passed, a year in prison cost the State 
of California about $15,000. Thus, the program would break even during its 5-year lifetime 
if 1000 prison-years were prevented. There are a number of different and plausible patterns 
that might achieve such reductions. For example, assuming a modal term of 2 years (see 
Table I), only 500 new imprisonments would have to be averted in under 5 years. With well 
over 20,000 prisoners released yearly, and postulating a baseline reincarceration rate within 
12 months of about 30% (see our descriptive data), 6000 individuals would ordinarily be 
returned to prison. If, as a result of unemployment insurance, 500 of these individuals (about 
8%) managed a successful reintroduction into society, the program would pay for itself in 
thefirst year alone. Given 5-year reincarceration rates of over 50% and 5 years to accumulate 
savings, it is clear that reductions of about 1% a year in reincarceration rates would easily 
pay for the program. And this ignores all of the other costs associated with crimes that would 
be eliminated (e.g., costs to victims). Clearly, SB224 could be a dramatic financial success 
with even small effects on recidivism rates. 
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groups, the logistic coefficient of -0.25 translates into a difference between 
the experimentals and the controls of about 5%. That is, the proportion of 
the experimentals who fail is about 5% less than the proportion of the 
controls who fail. Using the 5% figure as the basis of the null hypothesis 
(translated in a logistic regression coefficient), the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected. One would, therefore, tentatively accept the null hypothesis 
that the program worked at a cost-effective level. 
A fourth option would be to examine the data more closely to see if 
there are treatment effects obscured by a single, overall estimate of effect. 
To begin, we did not find important interaction effects for different kinds 
of offenders, although there was as suggestion that the program worked 
better for individuals who would have been better risks. For example, we 
did not find interaction effects by race. However, first-time offenders seemed 
to benefit more from eligibility (but not by greater than chance amounts) 
than offenders with a prior conviction record. 
Far more promising are the implications of fully separate logistic 
regressions run for each of the time periods. The treatment effect coefficient 
was -0.29 (t = - 0 .68 )  at 6 months grew to -0.45 (t = -1 .4 9 )  at 24 months 
and then declined to -0.22 (t = -0 .50 )  at 60 months. In other words, the 
effect was in the predicted direction in each time period but peaked at about 
2 years after release. 
If one takes this temporal pattern seriously, it suggests that any 
beneficial impact of eligibility is attenuated early when the high-risk cases 
are likely to fail and late when most of the individuals who remain in the 
pool are low risk. In other words, the treatment effect may be weak early 
because many potential recidivists are indeed very likely to get into trouble 
in spite of eligibility. Similarly, the treatment effect may be weak late because 
the survivors are very unlikely to get into trouble, even if eligibility were 
not available. In contrast, the treatment effect is greatest when the total 
pool at risk to reincarceration no longer has many sure losers but still is 
not constituted almost exclusively of sure winners. 
The temporal pattern of treatment also has implications for why the 
overall impact of eligibility is smaller in this analysis compared to the 
analysis published earlier (Berk and Rauma, 1983; Rauma and Berk, 1982). 
In brief, if the treatment's impact declines dramatically after about 24 
months, the average effect aggregated over the 60-month follow-up period 
will, in all probability, be attenuated compared to the average effect aggre- 
gated over the 10-month follow-up period. 
A final response is to take seriously the concept of ignorability. Recall 
that for the assignment of a treatment to be ignorable, all covariates associ- 
ated with both the treatment and the outcome must be included in the 
analysis. This clearly means that one need not include any covariates that 
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are not related to both the treatment and the outcome. In our case, despite 
a variety of  efforts to find statistically significant and large effects for various 
functions of hours worked in prison, we were unable to do so. Moreover, 
we paid a high price for including functions of hours; such functions were 
inevitably and highly associated with the treatment dummy variable. As a 
consequence, it is reasonable to drop hours worked in prison from the 
multivariate analysis. Any estimated treatment effect will be essentially 
unaltered because hours worked in prison is effectively unrelated to reincar- 
ceration. However, due to the reduction in coltinearity, the associated 
standard error will decline, and consequently, the t value will increase. In 
Table III ,  for example, the estimate of the treatment effect and the estimate 
of the impact of hours in the earlier time periods have a correlation of 
-0.70. Similarly, the estimate of the treatment effect and the estimate of 
the impact of hours squared in the earlier time period have a correlation 
of -0.47. 
As anticipated, dropping hours worked in prison from the analysis had 
a very small impact on the estimated treatment effect but dramatically 
altered its associated t value. The treatment effect increased slightly, from 
-0.25 to -0.30, while for the null hypothesis of no effect the t value increased 
substantially (in absolute value), from -1.31 to -2.66 (P < 0.005). Clearly, 
our estimated treatment effect is now statistically significant by any conven- 
tional standard. A combination of a small change in the estimated treatment 
effect and a large change in the standard error apparently confirms our 
suspicion that hours worked in prison was not an important covariate. 12 
5. C O N C L U S I O N  
Together, the graphical display in Fig. 5 and our time-to-failure results 
in Table II!  are evidence for a reduction in recidivism due to unemployment 
compensation eligibility. Unfortunately, traditional criminological theory 
provides little clue as to how this reduction might be achieved. This is 
hardly surprising, since the vast majority of criminological thought has been 
devoted to issues concerning the initial differences between criminals and 
noncriminals. Until recently, continuing criminal behavior had not been 
addressed systematically and theoretically. 
12 We could have employed the same strategy for each of the other covariates in Table Ill 
that did not have statistically significant effects on reincarceration. However, the largest 
correlation between the estimated treatment effect and estimates of the impact of any of the 
other covariates was -0.18. The typical correlation was about 0.10 in absolute value. Clearly, 
there was little to be gained in pruning the model further. 
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Economic theory, such as we posited earlier, makes these results rela- 
tively easy to understand. In terms of opportunity costs, the unemployment 
compensation program made the cost of going back to prison higher than 
it ordinarily would have been. And although our analysis has used eligibility 
as the assignment variable for treatment and control groups, we do know 
that everyone in our treatment group received at least one weekly payment. 
What is most interesting, compared to the earlier TARP study, is that 
unemployment compensation's inherent work disincentives did not over- 
whelm the crime-reducing effect of the compensation. 
In general, existing economic models do not predict whether individuals 
with additional nonlabor income (e.g., unemployment compensation) wilt 
choose to decrease their participation in legal income-generating activities, 
to decrease their participation in illegal income-generating activities, or 
some combination of the two. Rather, this is typically left to empirical 
estimation. TARP provides one set of estimates, in which some combination 
of  the two takes place, with the net result being no apparent treatment 
effect. The earlier analysis of the California program showed that the 
opportunity costs operated even more strongly, the net result being an 
overall negative, albeit weak, treatment effect. 
That the treatment effect seems to last for at least 5 years is support 
for the hypothesized treatment effect. Even if those receiving payments 
chose to remain out of  work during their eligibility period, they may have 
put that time to good use. The TARP results showed that individuals in the 
treatment groups used their time to seek better jobs. Thinking back to the 
sporadic patterns of employment that a majority of ex-offenders experiences, 
the transfer payments in TARP and in the SB224 may have been enough 
to break this cycle for many of the former inmates. As a result, given 
increased opportunity costs associated with employment (and perhaps 
increasing opportunity costs as individuals stay longer on the job), differ- 
ences between treatment and control groups, once established, are likely to 
remain for some time. 
The policy implications of our findings are intriguing, although perhaps 
not politically palatable. Modest amounts of unemployment compensation 
do not lead to a net increase in criminality among released felons. The 
evidence from four states and three studies is that there is probably a net 
reduction in criminality. The theoretical implications are also enlightening. 
Economic models of crime are useful tools for understanding the role of 
economic factors in individual criminality. More research needs to be done, 
obviously, to understand better the time allocation process. For other social 
scientists, more theoretical work is also needed, to define better the 
reciprocal, temporal relationship between employment and crime. 
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